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Date: April 29, 2024 Mon
Time: 10:38 pm
Time: 10:38 pm
Results for terrorist attacks
8 results foundAuthor: Jenkins, Brian Michael Title: Terrorist Attacks on Public Bus Transportation: A Preliminary Empirical Analysis Summary: "This report provides data on terrorist attacks against public bus transportation targets and serious crimes committed against such targets throughout the world. The data are drawn from the MTI database of attacks on public surface transportation, which is expanded and updated as information becomes available. This analysis is based on the database as of December 17, 2009. Data include the frequency and lethality with which buses, bus stations, and bus stops are attacked; the relationship between fatalities and attacks against bus targets and the relationship between injuries and attacks against those targets; how often, relative to other surface transportation targets, buses are attacked, first with all weapons and then with only explosive and incendiary devices; the relative lethality of attacks; and the distribution of attacks. It then presents some preliminary observations drawn from those data that can help stakeholders—governments, transit managers, and employees—to focus on the ways the most frequent and/or most lethal attacks are carried out as they consider measures to prevent or mitigate attacks that may be considered likely to happen in the United States." Details: San Jose, CA: Mineta Transportation Institute, San Jose State University, 2010. 110p. Source: Internet Resource; MTI Report SP 09-01 Year: 2010 Country: International URL: Shelf Number: 119381 Keywords: Public TransportationTerrorismTerrorist AttacksTransit CrimeTransit Safety |
Author: Jones, G.B. Title: Towards a Strategic Approach to Special Events Management in the Post-9/11 World Summary: ABSTRACT This thesis reviews background related to counterterrorism and law enforcement planning for major special events and it identifies some of the strategic issues that have emerged in special events management since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. It focuses on the subjective and objective components of the systems currently used by DHS and the FBI to categorize and resource special events, and it evaluates whether the current approach to major event planning is sufficient for contemporary counterterrorism challenges. The thesis considers how changes in the present system may improve interagency counterterrorism preparedness. Finally, it applies risk management principles to the interagency special event planning process to determine if these principles are useful for developing a rational, politically defensible, and fiscally responsible approach to federal resource allocation for major special events. Details: Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School, 2005. 131p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 20, 2019 at: https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a439225.pdf Year: 2005 Country: United States URL: https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a439225.pdf Shelf Number: 154290 Keywords: Counterterrorism Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Events Management Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Interagency Collaboration Law Enforcement Planning Risk Management Security Special Events Terrorism Terrorist Attacks |
Author: Australia-New Zealand Counter-Terrorism Committee Title: Active Armed Offender Guidelines for Crowded Places Summary: Introduction It is the responsibility of both Government and private sector stakeholders to work collaboratively to ensure that integrated and effective plans and arrangements are in place to prevent or reduce the impact of these incidents. Crowded places pose a broad range of security challenges for owners, operators and those responsible for providing a protective security overlay. They have been specifically identified - nationally and internationally - as attractive targets by those wishing to engage in terrorism, as well as disgruntled or mentally impaired individuals. Active armed offender attacks have occurred, and continue to occur, in crowded places around the world such as sporting stadiums, transport hubs and entertainment venues. Crowded places present a particularly attractive target for terrorism, due to the ready access to large numbers of potential victims. Attacks which occur in crowded places are particularly insidious because crowds using these places are often distracted by the venue event, reducing their situational awareness of their immediate environment. The Active Armed Offender Guidelines for Crowded Places are intended to increase understanding of the threat that active armed offender incidents pose in crowded places. The Guidelines seek to illustrate the key role that owners and operators of crowded places can play in developing and implementing appropriately informed prevention, preparedness, response and recovery arrangements to reduce the risks posed by such a threat. The guidance material has been developed by the 'Crowded Places Advisory Group' (CPAG) on behalf of the Australia-New Zealand Counter - Terrorism Committee (ANZCTC). It should be read in conjunction with Australia's Strategy for Protecting Crowded Places from Terrorism; Improvised Explosive Device Guidelines for Crowded Places, Chemical Weapon Guidelines and the Hostile Vehicle Mitigation Guidelines for Crowded Places. Purpose These Guidelines aim to increase the awareness of owners and operators of crowded places of the dynamic terrorism threat, while providing guidance on the issues and options which can be considered during risk mitigation and contingency planning activities. These Guidelines set out several broad guiding principles which public and private sector stakeholders should consider to reduce the vulnerability of their site to the threat of terrorism. The Guidelines aim to supplement and build upon some of those broad areas of focus, with particular emphasis on the following two principles: - Prevention and preparedness arrangements should be underpinned by an intelligence-led, risk management approach. - Effective security outcomes in complex crowded place environments require cooperation and coordination among stakeholders. Gaining a better understanding of the risk environment, and options for preventing and dealing with active armed offender incidents, will enable owners and operators in the private sector in particular to more effectively contribute to the collective national efforts to manage the active armed offender threat to crowded places. It is intended that this knowledge will lead to the development of 'contingency plans' or sub-plans to supplement existing emergency response plans and arrangements at facilities and venues. Details: Canberra, Australia: 2017. 13p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 9, 2019 at: https://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/Media-and-publications/Publications/Documents/active-armed-offender-guidelines-crowded-places.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Australia URL: https://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/Securityandyourcommunity/Pages/active-armed-offender-guidelines-for-crowded-places.aspx Shelf Number: 154371 Keywords: Active Armed OffenderAustraliaCounterterrorismCrowded PlacesCrowded Places Advisory GroupEntertainment VenuesEvent SecurityNew ZealandRadicalizationRisky FacilitiesSporting StadiumsTerrorismTerrorist AttacksVenue Security |
Author: Australia-New Zealand Counter-Terrorism Committee Title: Chemical Weapon Guidelines for Crowded Places Summary: Crowded places such as stadiums, shopping centres, pedestrian malls and major events will continue to be attractive targets for terrorists. Australia is not immune. Terrorists have plotted similar attacks here, including on crowded places, and we expect more will occur. Australian governments work with the private sector to protect crowded places. Our law enforcement and intelligence agencies are well-equipped to detect and disrupt plots, and they have a strong history of stopping terrorist attacks. Owners and operators of crowded places have the primary responsibility for protecting their sites, including a duty of care to take steps to protect people that work, use, or visit their site from a range of foreseeable threats, including terrorism. The objective of this strategy is to protect the lives of people working in, using, and visiting crowded places by making these places more resilient to terrorism. The success of this strategy rests on strong and sustainable partnerships across Australia between governments and the private sector to better protect crowded places. These partnerships give owners and operators access to better threat and protective security information. By accessing this information, owners and operators will be in a better position to protect their crowded places against terrorism. This strategy includes a suite of supplementary materials that will assist owners and operators to understand and implement protective security measures. These materials also contain modules on specific weapons and tactics used by terrorists. It is important owners and operators of crowded places read the strategy before they consult any of the additional tools and guidance materials. Details: Canberra, Australia: Australia-New Zealand Counter-Terrorism Committee, 2017. 7p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 9, 2019 at: https://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/Media-and-publications/Publications/Documents/chemical-weapon-guidelines-crowded-places.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Australia URL: https://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/Securityandyourcommunity/Pages/australias-strategy-for-protecting-crowded-places-from-terrorism.aspx Shelf Number: 154372 Keywords: Australia Chemical Weapon Crowded Places Intelligence Agencies Law Enforcement New Zealand Risky Facilities Terrorism Terrorist Attacks |
Author: Australia-New Zealand Counter-Terrorism Committee Title: Hostile Vehicle Guidelines for Crowded Places Summary: Who should read this and why - vehicles as weapons This publication provides an overview of hostile vehicle mitigation to all owners and operators responsible for the management of crowded places. It offers insight into how protective measures can be integrated into public and private places in order to mitigate and reduce the impact of vehicles being used as weapons. Owners and operators of crowded places want their site to be as safe as reasonably possible for their staff and the public. Organisational reputation, business continuity, and legal requirements for publicly accessible areas to be safe are all important reasons for owners and operators to understand and mitigate the risk posed by hostile vehicles. The aim of this document is to provide those responsible for crowded places with knowledge to inform security design considerations and decisions. It is intended to be a starting point to the development of effective and aesthetically complementary designs that help protect crowded places from hostile vehicles. Details: Canberra, Australia: 2017. 23p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 9, 2019 at: https://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/Media-and-publications/Publications/Documents/hostile-vehicle-guidelines-crowded-places.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Australia URL: https://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/Media-and-publications/Publications/Documents/hostile-vehicle-guidelines-crowded-places.pdf Shelf Number: 154374 Keywords: AustraliaCounterterrorismCrowded PlacesHostile VehiclesNew ZealandRisk ManagementRisk MitigationTerrorismTerrorist AttacksVehicles as Weapons |
Author: Australia-New Zealand Counter-Terrorism Committee Title: Australia's Strategy for Protecting Crowded Places from Terrorism Summary: Summary Crowded places such as stadiums, shopping centres, pedestrian malls, and major events will continue to be attractive targets for terrorists. The current National Terrorism Threat Level in Australia is PROBABLE, as outlined on www.nationalsecurity.gov.au. This reflects the advice of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) that individuals and groups continue to possess the intent and capability to conduct a terrorist attack in Australia. The elevated terrorist threat is likely to persist for the foreseeable future and it is not confined to any one city or metropolitan area. Attacks on crowded places overseas, including London Bridge and Borough Market in June 2017, Manchester Arena in May 2017, the Berlin Christmas market in December 2016, and the Bastille Day parade in Nice in July 2016, demonstrate how basic weapons - including vehicles, knives, and firearms - can be used by terrorists to devastating effect. Australia is not immune. Terrorists have plotted similar attacks here, including on crowded places, and we expect more will occur. In July 2017, police and intelligence officials disrupted a plot to conduct a terrorist attack using an improvised explosive device against the aviation sector, and a plot to develop an improvised chemical dispersion device for use in a terrorist attack on Australian soil. Australian governments work with the private sector to protect crowded places. Our law enforcement and intelligence agencies are well-equipped to detect and disrupt plots, and they have a strong history of stopping terrorist attacks. But the reality is it will not always be possible to prevent all terrorist attacks from occurring, so we need to strengthen our national arrangements in order to help owners and operators better protect crowded places from terrorism. Owners and operators of crowded places have the primary responsibility for protecting their sites, including a duty of care to take steps to protect people that work, use, or visit their site from a range of foreseeable threats, including terrorism. The objective of this Strategy is to protect the lives of people working in, using, and visiting crowded places by making these places more resilient. The approach taken to protect crowded places should be nationally consistent, proportionate and, to every extent possible, preserve the public's use and enjoyment of these places. It is not possible to protect everything, so owners and operators must prioritise the highest risk areas of a crowded place. This Strategy also ensures there is a clear and consistent understanding of what constitutes a crowded place, the roles and responsibilities of all those involved in protecting these places, and the threat environment in which they operate. The success of this Strategy rests on strong and sustainable partnerships across Australia between governments and the private sector to better protect crowded places. To this end, the Strategy sets out a new national framework, known as the 'Crowded Places Partnership.' This Partnership provides a consistent approach in each state and territory for trusted engagement between all levels of government, state and territory police, and owners and operators across the country. Details: Canberra, Australia: Australia-New Zealand Counter-Terrorism Committee, 2017. 13p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 9, 2019 at: https://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/media-and-publications/publications/documents/australias-strategy-protecting-crowded-places-terrorism.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Australia URL: https://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/Securityandyourcommunity/Pages/australias-strategy-for-protecting-crowded-places-from-terrorism.aspx Shelf Number: 154370 Keywords: Australia Crowded Places New Zealand Pedestrian Malls Risk Management Risk Mitigation Risky Facilities Shopping Centers Stadiums Terrorism Terrorist Attacks |
Author: Chadderton, Paula Title: Public-Private Partnerships to Disrupt Financial Crime: An Exploratory Study of Australia's Fintel Alliance Summary: The 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States and the 2014 Lindt Cafe siege in Sydney demonstrated the importance of timely, relevant and complete information sharing. While there is broad support for information sharing, it has proved challenging to implement and is regarded as 'one of the most deleterious obstacles to combating major and serious criminal conspiracies'. This paper examines whether a partnership comprising public and private sector organisations (PPP) can improve information sharing between those sectors and be effective in combating money laundering and terrorism financing-related crimes, using Australia's Fintel Alliance as a case study. The Fintel Alliance is a PPP led by the Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre, Australia's financial intelligence unit and anti-money laundering/counter-terrorism financing regulator. The Fintel Alliance brings together 22 public and private sector organisations with the goal of combatting money laundering and terrorism financing-related crimes and is regarded as 'the first true public-private partnership of its kind in the world' in its co-location of participants and sharing of information. Drawing on the results of semi-structured interviews and a focus group with analysts, managers and senior managers of Fintel Alliance member and non-member organisations, this paper examines whether and why PPPs have improved information sharing between public and private sector organisations, and the factors that have contributed to the success (or otherwise) of those arrangements. The paper also makes recommendations on changes needed to improve information sharing using PPPs. Although the Fintel Alliance is still maturing as an organisation, its experiences are a useful guide for others contemplating developing or enhancing existing PPPs that target financial crime. For most interviewees, Fintel Alliance membership is viewed positively and provides opportunities to understand the challenges faced by counterparts. However, for some members concerns remain about their potential exposure to regulatory non-compliance action or the possibility that their commercial competitiveness could be reduced through participation in PPP activities. Notwithstanding such concerns, Fintel Alliance members consider the opportunity to develop greater awareness of financial crime risks, collaborate on projects that could benefit them, industry and the community, and potentially influence AML/CTF regulation, mean involvement in the PPP is valuable and worthwhile. This paper considers that for PPPs to benefit their members, industry and ultimately the community, it is imperative that they undertake projects or other activities that maximise members' participation, incorporate a preventative focus, and align with the PPP's strategic goals. Projects that incorporate these attributes are more likely to be valued by members and consequently attract support and resources. This paper finds that inviting non-members to participate in projects, particularly if their information could be crucial to a project, could also enhance a PPP's effectiveness and broaden the value of PPP projects to industry. In the Fintel Alliance case, members recognised the need to involve non-members in projects, particularly if they did not hold all the information pertinent to a project's success. However, the challenges of implementing a PPP are not only legislative, technical or datadriven, they also relate to relationships, trust and risk appetite. Consequently, PPPs can play a critical role in overcoming reticence to sharing information between the public and private sectors, building trust and in expanding our knowledge of financial crime. With this in mind, we make the following recommendations for others considering establishing or enhancing a PPP targeting financial crime: -Recommendation 1: Start small and grow over time. -Recommendation 2: Consider involving members from other organisations or sectors. -Recommendation 3: Start within existing legislative and technological parameters.-Recommendation 4: Provide clarity on PPP roles and responsibilities. -Recommendation 5: Consider projects that maximise PPP members' participation and incorporate a preventative focus. -Recommendation 6: Engage, and if possible co-locate, the most appropriate staff to work on projects. -Recommendation 7: Communicate timely and meaningful information about PPP projects and activities to industry, government and the community. -Recommendation 8: Review laws to support information sharing to fight financial crime. Details: London, United Kingdom: Swift Institute, 2019. 69p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 27, 2019 at: https://swiftinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/SIWP-2017-003-Information-Sharing_FINTEL_Alliance_FINAL.pdf Year: 2019 Country: Australia URL: https://swiftinstitute.org/research/public-private-partnerships-to-disrupt-financial-crime-an-exploratory-study-of-australias-fintel-alliance/ Shelf Number: 156573 Keywords: Anti-Money Laundering Financial Crime Information Sharing Public Private Partnerships Terrorist Attacks |
Author: Anderson, David Title: Implementation Stock-Take: Unclassified Summary of Conclusions Summary: This is the unclassified summary of a stock-take of the progress made by MI5 and Counter-Terrorism Policing (CTP) in implementing the recommendations arrived at in the Operational Improvement Review and Post-Attack Reviews of 2017. It summarises progress to 31st January 2019 and looks in greater depth in some key areas: use of data, management of closed subjects of interest (CSOIs), multi-agency centre (MAC) pilots, and non-Islamist extremism. -Both MI5 and CTP were conscientious and frank in providing me with the documents and briefings required. I was able to meet and question several dozen security officials, police officers and others, including the senior management of each organisation. -Implementation has been tackled with energy and commitment. As of 24 January 2019, 85% of the 104 recommendations were complete (63%) or on track for delivery (22%). With possible very limited exceptions the recommendations were forecast to be complete on schedule, by Q4 2019. -Good progress has been made for example on data discovery projects, CSOI management and non-Islamist terrorism. Positive results have been noted from some of the reforms, but it has not yet been possible to make an authoritative assessment of their overall benefits or of any opportunity cost. -Obstacles to delivery remain, notably in the fields of data, information management and multi-agency interventions. Progress on Prevent data-sharing has been delayed while officials across government work up a proposal for ministerial approval. The most serious deficiencies, where daunting challenges persist, relate to CTP's data capabilities. The MAC pilots have required much effort for (so far) limited reward, but their extension to Q1 2020 should enable an informed judgement to be reached as to how the MAC principles can best be deployed. -MI5 and CTP are committed to operating in a legal and ethical manner. Both the Home Office and external oversight bodies (notably the ISC and IPCO) should however continue to check that their activities remain within legal and ethical bounds as technology develops, particularly as regards the use of data. -Though it will never be possible to prevent every attack, the measures being taken will, in my opinion, strengthen the existing ability of MI5 and CTP to stop most of them. Details: London: Brick Court Chambers, 2019. 46p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 27, 2019 at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/807911/2017_terrorist_attacks_reviews_implementation_stock_take.pdf Year: 2019 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/807911/2017_terrorist_attacks_reviews_implementation_stock_take.pdf Shelf Number: 156587 Keywords: Counterterrorism Terrorism Terrorist Attacks |